Abstract. We present a discretely timed spi-calculus. A primitive for key compromise allows us to model key compromise attacks, thus going beyond the standard Dolev-Yao attacker model. A primitive for reading a global clock allows us to express protocols based on timestamps, which are common in practice. We accompany the timed spi-calculus with a type system, prove that well-typed protocols are robustly safe for secrecy and authenticity and present examples of well-typed protocols as well as an example where failure to typecheck reveals a (well-known) flaw.
Introduction
Models for cryptographic protocols often assume perfect cryptography-an example is the spi-calculus [3] -and ignore the fact that session keys can be compromised given a sufficient amount of time. Yet typical protocols for the distribution of session keys are careful to prevent attacks that fool honest agents into accepting compromised session keys. A security goal of such protocols is that after the end of a protocol run each principal possesses a session key that is currently secret (and will remain secret until its expiration time). This goal could not be expressed, for instance, in [11] , which instead uses injective agreement as a security goal for key distribution protocols. In this paper, we extend the spi-calculus with a simple notion of time so that we can express such security goals. We also add a primitive for key compromise, which allows us to express key compromise attacks, thus going beyond the Dolev-Yao attacker model. A primitive for reading a global clock allows us to express protocols based on timestamps, which are common in practice.
Our model of time is very coarse and simple. A clock-tick represents the end of an epoch. Protocol designers may specify that a key is a short-term secret and a key compromise primitive cracks keys that are short-terms secrets. Cracking uses up all time of the current epoch (and not more than that) moving on to the next epoch. So after a clock-tick short-term secrets cannot be considered secret anymore and expire. Cracking a key is the only interesting action that uses up time. The usual spi-calculus actions are instantaneous. The safety of cryptographic protocols often depends on the fact that sessions expire when waiting for input for too long. We model this by letting input and most other statements expire with a clock-tick.
We think that our simple model of time is enough to capture important aspects of security protocols in the presence of key compromise. On the other hand, because of its simplicity reasoning in this model remains tractable. In order to make this point, we have accompanied our timed spi-calculus with a type system for secrecy and authenticity and prove its robust safety. We show how an attempt to typecheck the NeedhamSchroeder Symmetric Key Protocol [20] reveals its flaw and typecheck Denning-Sacco's fix [8] of this protocol. It turns out that proving our type system safe for short-term assertions is considerably simpler than the proofs for injective agreement in [11] , which may suggest that short-term assertions are easier to reason about than injective agreement.
Syntax
Our protocol description language is an extension of the spi-calculus. In this section, we define its syntax: Messages are built from variables, time constants and the empty message by concatenation, symmetric encryption and message tagging. Unlike some other versions of the spi-calculus, we do not distinguish between variables and names. The ciphertext {M} K represents M encrypted with symmetric key K. Key K may be an arbitrary message, but the typing rules for honest agents require K to be a variable. The term L(M) represents M tagged by label L. Label L may be an arbitrary message, but the typing rules for honest agents require L to be a variable. Message tagging is a common technique for avoiding type confusion attacks [17, 4] and is often treated explicitly in typed spi-calculi. A ciphertext that is formed by honest principals is typically of the form {l(M)} k , where k is a secret key and l is a public message tag, whose purpose it is to distinguish the plaintext l(M) from other plaintexts that are encrypted by the same key k. As usual for spi-calculi, the process language includes a π-calculus extended with primitives for encryption. The importance of this paper is the inclusion of the operation crack M is {x:T } y:U . This operation gives attackers the capability of cracking short-term keys given a sufficient amount of time. Thus, the attacker capabilities that we model go beyond the standard Dolev-Yao model. We also include an operation clock(x:T ) for reading a global clock. This clock-operation permits to express protocols with timestamps, which are quite common in practice. For specification purposes, secrecy and correspondence assertions may be inserted into programs. The meaning of secrecy assertions is the intuitive one. Correspondence assertions are a standard method for specifying authenticity. They specify that in every protocol run every end(M)-assertion must have been recently preceded by a corresponding begin!(M)-assertion. In this paper, we restrict our attention to short-term, many-to-one correspondences for short-term, non-injective agreement.
Processes with Assertions:
x: T type-annotated variables, | x| = | T | τ ∈ {lt, st} long/short qualifier (long-term or short-term) O, P, Q, R ::= process
short-term begin-assertion: begin session M A, B,C ::= assertions end(M)
short-term end-assertion: session M has recently begun θ(M) secrecy assertion θ ::= secrecy predicates τ-secret τ = st: secret for the current epoch; τ = lt: secret forever public public
Prefixing and replication bind more tightly than parallel composition. We often elide 0 from the end of processes, write (out N M; P) for (out N M | P), write (A; P) for (A | P), and write (new θ (n:T ); P) for (new(n:T ); θ(n); P). We write fv(P) for the set of free variables of P; similarly for messages and other objects that may contain variables.
Semantics
The architecture of our operational semantics is inspired by [18] . It is defined as a reduction relation on states of the form (t; n;Ā || P), where t is a natural number representing the global time, n is a binder for (Ā, P)'s free names,Ā is the set of correspondences that can be ended in the particular run, and P is the process that remains to be executed. The reduction rules are divided into a set of instantaneous reductions, which are assumed to take no time, and a set of tick-reductions, which use up all time in the current epoch moving on to the next epoch. The instantaneous reductions are pretty standard:
Structural Process Equivalence, P ≡ Q:
Instantaneous Reductions, (t; n;Ā || P) → (t; m;B || Q):
Tick-Reductions, (t; n;Ā || P)
(Tick Par) (t; n;Ā || P)
We write ⇒ for the reflexive and transitive closure of (→ ∪ σ →). The tick-reduction rule (Tick Par) ensures that a clock-tick happens simultaneously in every branch of a parallel composition. crack operates as expected and uses up time. Process replication and output remain alive in the next epoch. Importantly, every other syntactic form expires with a clock-tick, degenerating to the null-process. In particular, if a process waits for input for more than one epoch it aborts and declines to accept later incoming messages. Many security protocols depend on this kind of behavior, and we have decided to make expiring input the default in our process calculus. Because process replication survives clock-ticks, we can express the capability to start a session at any time in the future. Our choice to let asynchronous output survive clock-ticks is a bit arbitrary. A language where output expires would probably have been equally suitable for modeling security protocols.
Definition 1 (Safety). P is safe for secrecy
. P is safe for authenticity iff (s; fv(P); / 0 || P) ⇒ (t; n;Ā || end(M) | Q) implies end(M) ∈Ā. P is safe iff it is both safe for secrecy and authenticity.
Definition 2 (Opponent Processes).
A process is an opponent process iff its only assertions are of the form public(M) and all its type annotations are the special type Un.
Definition 3 (Robust Safety).
A process P is robustly safe iff (P | O) is safe for all opponent processes O.
Our type system is designed so that well-typed processes with public free names are robustly safe:
Theorem (Robust Safety) If ( n: T public( n)) and ( n: T P), then P is robustly safe.
Examples
We will use derived forms for lists and matching against tagged lists. Their definition uses derived forms for list types as type annotations. Type annotations have no impact operationally and the definition of list types is postponed to the type system.
Derived Forms for Lists and Matching Against Lists:
Example 1: Establishing a session key using a nonce.
B generates nonce n B → A n A generates short-term secrets kab and m A begins! "A sending session key kab to B" and "A sending secret message m to B" A → B {msg 1 n, kab } lab , {msg 2 m } kab B asserts st-secret(kab) and ends "A sending session key kab to B" B asserts st-secret(m) and ends "A sending secret message m to B" Bob wants to receive a secret message from Alice. To this end, he sends Alice a freshly generated nonce n. In reply, Alice generates a short-term session key kab and sends it to Bob together with n and encrypted by their shared long-term key lab. Alice also sends the secret message m encrypted by kab. The names msg 1 and msg 2 are used as tags.
To express this protocol in spi, we assume that X is some finite set of principal names and abbreviate new a,b∈X lt-secret (lab:?) for the generation of their long-term keys and ∏ x,y∈X P(x, y) for the parallel composition of all processes P(x, y). We use the additional tags key and sec in our correspondence assertions. This protocol is robustly safe: Bob only accepts the session key kab if received shortly after he generated nonce n. Because the ciphertext contains the fresh nonce, Bob knows that it must have been formed recently and that it is not a replay of an old message. Consequently, the session key that is contained in the ciphertext is still a secret and A has recently begun the key(A, kab, B)-session. Bob's second secrecy and end-assertions are safe, because Bob's session expires before opponents can possibly have cracked the session key. With appropriate type annotations this protocol typechecks.
Example 2: Needham-Schroeder Symmetric Key Protocol (NSSK).
In this protocol, Alice and Bob want to establish a short-term session key kab via key server S using long-term keys las and lbs. NSSK is not robustly safe and, by the robust safety theorem, does not typecheck. Alice's secrecy-and end-assertions are safe. Bob's secrecy and end-assertions, however, are unsafe. The problem is that msg 3 may be a replay from an old protocol run. Here is an opponent process O that compromises this protocol; (NSSK | O) is unsafe for both secrecy and authenticity: 
A generates nonce na A → S A, B, na S generates short-term secret kab S begins! init(kab, A, B) and resp(kab, B, A) S →
O ∆ = inp net (m 3 :
Type System
For the type system we extend the set of assertions from Section 2:
Type-Level Assertions:
A, B,C ::= assertions . . .
A is stamped by nonce N Type-level assertions are needed to define type environments: An environment is simply an assertion set. Let E, F, G,Ā,B,C range over environments. An important judgment of our system is assertion entailment, E Ā . We usually use meta-variables E, F, G left of andĀ,B,C right of . We define the subjects of environments:
Types:
empty text with preconditionĀ X,Y, Z ::= type-schemes for tags
0. Names generated by new are required to have generative types. Types include a top type, dependent pair types, a type Un for public messages and types τ-Secret (where τ ∈ {lt, st}) for long-or short-term secrets. In addition, there are the following types:
-The key type τ-Key( M) is the type of secret keys shared by principals M.
-The ok-type Ok(Ā) is a type for the empty message. In order to assign this type to the empty message in environment E, it is required that (E Ā ). -The authentication type τ-Auth(K, M) is a type of tagged messages that require authentication by principals M's shared τ-key K. -The tag type Tag(T → τ-Auth(k:U, x: V )) is a type of tags l that may tag messages M of type T {k, x←K, N}. The type of the resulting tagged message l(M) is τ-Auth(K, N).
For instance, consider the following tag: , m, B) )), this tag can be used to tag message m (= (m, ())) forming l m of type st-Auth(kab, A, B), which can then be authenticated by encryption with kab resulting in {l m } kab . Typeschemes for tags are a form of dependent types. Technically, they resemble type-schemes for polymorphic data constructors in languages like Haskell or ML (with the difference that binders range over messages instead of types). Ok-types are important as a tool to "statically communicate" assertions between parallel processes for the purpose of typechecking. Typically, the setĀ in Ok(Ā) contains assertions of the form end(M) indicating that it is safe to end M-sessions. When typechecking a sender of the empty message at type Ok(end(M)), the typechecker is required to prove that it is safe to end M-sessions. On the other hand, when typechecking a receiver of a message of type Ok(end(M)), the typechecker may use that it is safe to end M-sessions.
Subtyping, T ≤ U:
The rule (Sub Key) expresses that long-or short-term keys are long-or short-term secrets, and (Sub Tag) expresses that tags are public. Pair types are covariant, by (Sub Pair). The rules (Sub Ok Un) and (Sub Pair Un) express that the empty message and pairs of public messages may be published.
Step-Function, step(Ā):
The step-function maps an assertion set to the assertion set that it evolves into with a clock-tick: assertions fresh(N) or now(N) are dropped, st-secret(M) is mapped to public(M), short-term types are mapped to Un, and all other clauses are the identity or defined by structural induction. We call an assertion setĀ long-term if step(Ā) =Ā, and short-term otherwise.
Assertion Entailment, E Ā :
The rule (Time) expresses that time values are public. (Nonce Stamp) is typically used to stamp short-term assertions. Importantly, stamped assertions are long-term. Thus, the rule (Nonce Stamp) turns short-term assertions into long-term assertions by associating them with a nonce N. The rule (Time Stamp) is similar. The process-level typing rules (Nonce Unstamp) and (Time Unstamp) presented below, then permit a "receiver" of an assertion N-stamped i (A) to use A, if he can validate that N is a fresh nonce or the current time. Note that the rule (Time Stamp) requires that the "creator" of a timestamped assertion knows that the stamp is current: it would be dangerous if he used a future timestamp. The rule (Encrypt) is consistent with our informal interpretation of authentication types; ciphertexts are public. (Encrypt Un) and (Tag Un) allow us to typecheck Dolev-Yao attackers; typically, these rules are not used for type-checking honest agents. Perhaps the most interesting typing rule is (Tag) for formation of trusted tagged messages. The premise for τ = st enforces that short-term keys may not encrypt longterm secrets; a requirement that is obviously needed for long-term secrecy. The premise for τ = lt enforces that long-term keys may not encrypt messages of short-term types. Without this premise the system would be unsafe because a receiver of a short-term assertion under a long-term key has no guarantee that the short-term assertion is still valid at the time of reception. It is still possible to communicate short-term assertions under long-term keys, provided the short-term assertions are associated with nonces or timestamps using (Nonce Stamp) and (Time Stamp). The rule (Pair) is the standard rule for dependent pair types.
replicated processes unfold instantaneously (by (Redn Equiv)); checking P in step(E) is needed because replicated processes survive clock-ticks (by (Tick Remain)); because the step-function is idempotent, it suffices to check P in environment step(E) instead of step n (E) for all n ≥ 1. For typechecking the process continuation P in (new(x:T ); P) or (clock(x:Un); P), we may assume that x is fresh or current. Remember that specification processes end(M) and θ(M) are both processes and assertions, so their typing rules are given with the rules for assertion entailment.
Typed Examples
We will annotate the earlier example with types using these derived forms:
Derived Forms for List Types:
Example 1: Establishing a session key using a nonce. Recall Example 1 from Section 4.
Here are the types for the global names:
In the type of msg 1 , note that the typing rules force us to stamp the type assertion k:st-Key(p, q). If we directly annotated the binder k by short-term type st-Key(p, q), then the protocol would not typecheck: Alice would not be permitted to form the message msg 1 t, kab because step(st-Key(p, q)) = st-Key(p, q) in violation to the premise for τ = lt in the (Tag)-rule. Here is the type-annotated spi-calculus specification: 
Here is the type that we want to give to the message tag: However, this type does not permit Alice to form the tagged message msg 3 A, kab because step(st-Key(p, q)) = st-Key(p, q) in violation to the premises of (Tag). Example 3: Denning-Sacco Protocol with acknowledgment. The Denning-Sacco protocol for establishing a short-term session key avoids the key compromise attack on NSSK by including a timestamp. We have added to the Denning-Sacco protocol Bob's acknowledgment for receipt of session key kab, which is achieved by Bob using kab to encrypt a tagged null-message.
A → S A, B S generates short-term secret kab and timestamp t S begins! init (S, kab, A, B) and resp(S, kab, B, A 
Type Preservation
Like in other type systems for spi-calculi, robust safety is a consequence of a type preservation theorem. In this section, we present this theorem and a few selected lemmas that are needed to prove it. Proofs and additional lemmas are omitted and given in an extended version of this paper. In order to define well-typed computation states, we extend the judgment for assertion entailment: Let (E +Ā ) iff it is derivable by the -rules plus the rules (Useless Nonce) and (Useless Time) below. The relation ≤ in (Useless Time) is defined by:
Well-typed Computation States, (t; n; end{ M} || P) : :
The additional rules (Useless Nonce) and (Useless Time) allow to stamp assertions with messages that are neither fresh nonces nor current or future times. This is safe because the typing rules for unstamping are not applicable in such cases. Technically, these rules are needed to prove the following lemma.
Lemma (Step Invariance) If E is basic and (E +Ā ), then (step + (E) + step(Ā)).
Proof step + /step maps (Nonce Stamp) to (Useless Nonce), and (Time Stamp) to (Useless Time). (Encrypt) is mapped to itself if τ = lt and to (Encrypt Un) if τ = st.
(Tag) is mapped to itself if τ = lt and to (Tag Un) if τ = st.
Here are the definitions that are needed to fully understand the step invariance lemma: We call environment E basic iff it is of the form E = ( n: T , end{ M}, fresh{ N}, now(t)) for distinct n and generative T . Let step + (E, now(t)) ∆ = (step(E), now(t + 1)).
Lemma (Cut) If E is basic, (E +Ā ) and (Ā B ), then (E +B ).
This cut lemma is not hard to prove.
Step invariance and cut are used to prove that tickreductions preserve well-typedness. More generally, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem (Type Preservation) If ((t; n;Ā || P) : ) and (t; n;Ā || P) ⇒ (s; m;B || Q), then ((s; m;B || Q) :
).
Conclusion
Related Work. Compared to other work on the spi-calculus [3, 1, 11, 12, 10, 2, 16], the novelty of this paper is the addition of time, key-compromising attackers and shortterm assertions for secrecy and authenticity. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first spi-calculus type system for reasoning about short-term assertions. There are some formal models for cryptographic protocols that deal with recency or key compromise implicitly (without explicitly modeling time): BAN logic [5] has a primitive formula for freshness, which allows reasoning about recency. Guttman shows how to reason about recency for nonce-based protocols within the strand space model [15] . Both these works are based on the assumption that protocol sessions time out before short-term keys can possibly get compromised. Paulson's inductive method [21] models key compromise by a rule called "Oops" for leaking short-term keys, and his safety theorems typically require premises that certain data has not been leaked to dishonest principals. Recently, Gordon and Jeffrey [13] have presented a type system for proving conditional secrecy that models key compromise in a similar way.
There are also some models that deal with time more explicitly: Evans and Schneider [9] analyze time dependent security properties in tock-CSP using theorem proving with the rank function method. Rank functions have similarities with type systems: on the one hand, both rank functions and type systems are designed to prove safety properties without assuming a bounded number of sessions and, on the other hand, both require less help from protocol specifiers than general theorem proving-the supply of a rank-function or type-annotations is enough. Gorrieri, Locatelli and Martinelli [14] present the process algebra tCryptoSPA with event-based time for expressing cryptographic protocols. Both tock-CSP and tCryptoSPA seem a bit more expressive than our timed spi-calculus. For instance, these languages can express processes that patiently wait for input arbitrarily long, whereas it is not obvious how to express this in our language. On the other hand, both tock-CSP and tCryptoSPA allow some anomalies, like timestops, that our language omits. Bozga, Ene and Lakhnech [19] and Delzanno and Ganty [7] model real time and present symbolic procedures for checking time sensitive safety properties. These procedures are more automatic than typechecking; they do not require help in the form of type annotations. On the other hand, they assume a bounded number of sessions [19] or do not guarantee termination [7] . The Casper model checker is based on discretely timed CSP and can analyze protocols for timed agreement and timed secrecy [22] . It requires bounds on the size of protocols. Most of the languages discussed in this paragraph, with the exception of [19] , do not explicitly model key compromising attackers. [19] models key compromising attackers by creating for each short-term key a key-cracking process that accepts messages encrypted under this key, then waits for a while and then publishes the key. In this model, attackers can crack keys by directing ciphertexts to key-cracking processes. Key compromising attackers could probably be modeled similarly in the other languages above, but we expect that key-cracking processes create additional problems for some of the verification methods.
Limitations of our Model of Time.
A limitation is that we cannot distinguish between the amounts of time that it takes to timeout and the time needed for cracking short-term keys. In reality, the former is usually much shorter than the latter. While it is often safe to assume that timeout happens later than it really does, it sometimes prevents us from expressing attacks. Consider, for instance, the Wide Mouthed Frog protocol (WMF):
There is a type confusion attack on WMF, where the attacker repeatedly intercepts the second message and plays it back to the server as the first message of another run. The attacker, thus, always has a message of the correct format that contains a current timestamp and after cracking kab he can fool either principal to accept the compromised kab as recent. In our model, the server's timestamp t s will always be equal to the initiator's timestamp t i . Therefore, the attack is not possible in the model. (Fortunately, WMF still does not typecheck, though.) While it would not be hard to refine our model of time, it is less clear how to refine the type system. Future Work. Although this article deals with symmetric cryptography only, we expect no problems to integrate this work into a more general system with public cryptography and other cryptographic operators [12, 16] . Our type system is simple and can typecheck many key distribution protocols from the literature [6] . While we plan to investigate how it can be extended to verify protocols with additional intricacies, like Yahalom [5] , we do not think that such extensions are of utmost importance, because often similar, sometimes simpler, protocols exist that achieve the same security goals and obey our type discipline, for instance BAN's Yahalom simplification [5] . More interestingly, we plan to investigate if we can find similar type systems for refined models of time. The following facts are all quite obvious.
Proofs Lemma 1 (Transitivity of Subtyping). If T ≤ U and U ≤ V , then T ≤ V .

Proof
Lemma 2 (Basic Facts). fv(step(T
)) ⊆ fv(T ); fv(step(Ā)) ⊆ fv(Ā); subj(step(E)) = subj(E); step(T ){ρ} = step(T {ρ}); step(Ā){ρ} = step(Ā{ρ}); step(step(E)) = step(E); subj(E){ρ} = subj(E{ρ}); T ≤ U ⇔ T {ρ} ≤ U{ρ}.
Lemma 3 (Free Variables). If (E R ), then (E ) and fv(R ) ⊆ fv(E).
Proof By induction on (E R )'s derivation.
Lemma 4 (Environment Union). If (E ) and (F ), then (E, F
Proof Recall that, by definition, (E ) iff fv(E) ⊆ fv(subj(E)). We have fv(E, F) = fv(E) ∪ fv(F) ⊆ fv(subj(E)) ∪ fv(subj(F)) = fv(subj(E) ∪ subj(F)) = fv(subj(E, F)).
Lemma 5 (Weakening). If (E,Ā ) and (E R ), then (E,Ā R ).
Lemma 6 (Specialization). If (E, M:U R ) and (E T ≤ U), then (E, M:T R ).
Proof By induction on (E, M:U R )'s derivation.
Lemma 7 (Substitutivity). If (E R ), then (E{ρ} R {ρ}).
Proof By induction on (E R )'s derivation. Suppose (E R ) and let ρ be a substitution.
Proof case, R = : We know that fv(E) ⊆ fv(subj(E)) and want to show that
fv(E{ρ}) ⊆ fv(subj(E{ρ})). Let x ∈ fv(E{ρ}). We distinguish two subcases. Suppose first that x ∈ fv(E)−dom(ρ). Then x ∈ fv(subj(E))−dom(ρ). Then x ∈ fv(subj(E){ρ}) = fv(subj(E{ρ})). Suppose now that x ∈ fv(ρ(y)) and y ∈ fv(E) ∩ dom(ρ). Then y ∈ fv(subj(E)). Then x ∈ fv(ρ(y)) ⊆ fv(subj(E){ρ}) = fv(subj(E{ρ})).
Proof case, (Tag): We know:
By renaming of bound variables, we may assume that (dom(ρ) ∪ ran(ρ)) ∩ {k, x} = / 0.
Note that applying the substitution ρ preserves the two implications for τ = st and τ = lt.
Define ρ ∆ = (k, x←K{ρ}, N{ρ}). Note that (ρ ; ρ) = (ρ; ρ ). By induction hypothesis, we get:
Then by (Tag):
Proof case, (Untag): We know:
By renaming of bound variables, we may assume that
. By induction hypothesis, we get:
Then by (Untag):
The other proof cases are similar.
Let (E +Ā ) iff it is derivable by the -rules plus the rules (Useless Nonce) and (Useless Time) below.
Good Computation States, (t; n; end{ M} || P) : :
Lemma 8 (Free Variables). If (E + R ), then (E ) and fv(R ) ⊆ fv(E).
Proof Like the proof of Lemma 3 with two additional proof cases for the additional rules.
τ-Secret is not a supertype of Un. M cannot be of the form M = L(N), because τ-Secret is neither a supertype of Un nor of τ -Auth(K, N ) for any τ , K, N . M cannot be a pair, because τ-Secret is neither a supertype of a pair type nor Un. M cannot be the empty message, because τ-Secret is not a supertype of any ok-type.
The following lemma is essential for proving type preservation for the reduction semantics. Its proof is less obvious than in type systems that are purely syntax-directed. The difficulty arises because of subtyping and rules like (Encrypt Un) and (Tag Un), which are necessary to model attackers as well-typed processes. This is typical for type systems for cryptographic protocols. The type system is carefully designed so that the following inversion properties hold.
Lemma 15 (Rule Inversions)
. Suppose E is basic.
Proof Suppose E is basic.
Part (a):
The derivation of this judgment can only end in (And), and we obtain (E + {M} K : Un) and (E + K : τ-Key( N)). We strip off all pointless uses of (Sub)/(Sub Refl) from the end of (E + {M} K : Un)'s derivation. If the resulting derivation ended in (Encrypt Un), then we would have (E + K : τ-Key( N), K : Un), in contradiction to Lemma 14. Moreover, the derivation cannot end in (Id), because E is basic. Therefore, the derivation can only end in (Encrypt). N) . So there is a type scheme X = (T → τ-Auth(k:U , x: V )) such that (E + L : Tag(X )) and (E + M : T {k, x←K, N}). By Lemmas 13 and 12 and functionality of E, it follows that Tag(X) and Tag(X ) have a common subtype. Because tag types are minimal types, it follows that X = X . In particular, T = T . Thus, (E + M : T {k, x←K, N}). Part (h): Suppose (E + fresh(N), N-stamped n (A)). The derivation of this judgment can only end in (And), and we obtain (E + fresh(N)) and (E N-stamped n (A)). The derivation of the former can only end in (Id), so fresh(N) ∈ E. Then the derivation of the latter cannot end in (Useless Nonce), so it ends in (Nonce Stamp). Then (E A).
Part (i): Suppose (E + now(N), N-stamped t (A)). The derivation of this judgment can only end in (And), and we obtain (E + now(N)) and (E N-stamped n (A)). The derivation of the former can only end in (Id), so now(N) ∈ E. Then the derivation of the latter cannot end in (Useless Time), so it ends in (Time Stamp). Then (E A).
We have to do a bit of proof normalization to cope with the fact that the process-level rules 
Lemma 16 (Normal Derivations). Every derivable judgment has a normal derivation.
Proof If a (Par)-node has critical rule as a child, they can be permuted. For instance:
Similarly if the first child of (Repl) is a critical rule:
If the second child of (Good State) is a critical rule, this can be eliminated using cut and Lemma 15(g), (h), (i). For instance, suppose that a derivation has the following shape:
Let E = (now(t), n: T , end{ M}, fresh{ N}). From (E +Ā ) and (Ā M : Ok(B)) we obtain (E M : Ok(B)), by cut. Then (E +B ), by Lemma 15(g). Then (E +Ā ,B), by (And). So we now have a derivation of the following form:
A,B P (Good State) (t; n; end{ M} || P) :
In the same way, we can eliminate all remaining critical rules from the end of D 3 .
Call a derivation subnormal iff it is normal and does not end in a critical rule.
Lemma 17 (Congruence Preserves Typing). If P ≡ Q, then (E P) has a subnormal derivation iff (E Q) has a subnormal derivation.
Proof By induction on (P ≡ Q)'s derivation.
Lemma 18 (Instantaneous Reduction Preserves Typing).
If ((t; n;Ā || P) : ) and (t; n;Ā || P) → (t; m;B || Q), then ((t; m;B || Q) : ).
Proof By induction on (t; n;Ā || P) → (t; m;B || Q)'s derivation. Let D ((t; n;Ā || P) : ) be normal and (t; n;Ā || P) → (t; m;B || Q). From the premises of D's last rule, we obtain a basic environment E = ( n: T , end{ M}, fresh{ N}, now(t)), whereĀ = end{ M},
Proof case, (Redn Equiv): In this case, P ≡ P , (t; n;Ā || P ) → (t; m;B || Q ) and Q ≡ Q. By Lemma 17, (C P ), thus ((t; n;Ā || P ) : ). By induction hypothesis, ((t; m;B || Q ) : ). First normalizing the derivation of this judgment and then applying Lemma 17 results in ((t; m;B || Q) : ).
Proof case, (Redn New): In this case, P = (new(k:
Because D is subnormal, it ends in (Par) preceded by (New). Therefore (C P ), U is generative and (C R). Then (C P | R = Q), by weakening and (Par). On the other hand, (E +C ), by weakening, (Id) and (And).
Proof case, (Redn IO):
In this case, P = (out N M | inp N (x:U); P | R), m = n,B =Ā and Q = P {x←M} | R. Because D is subnormal, it ends in (Par) preceded by (Out) and (In). Therefore (C M:Un), (C, x:Un P ) and (C R). LetC = (C, M:Un). From (C, x:Un P ) we obtain (C P {x←M}), by substitutivity. From (C P {x←M}) and (C R), we obtain (C P {x←M} | R = Q), by weakening and (Par). On the other hand, cutting (E +C ) with (C M:Un) results in (E +C ).
Proof Proof case, (Redn Clock): In this case, P = (clock(x:T ); P | R), m = n,B =Ā and
Because D is subnormal, it ends in (Par) preceded by (Clock). Therefore (C, x:Un, now(x) P ) and (C R). LetC = (C,t:Un, now(t)). From (C, x:Un, now(x) P ) we obtain (C P {x←t}), by substitutivity. From (C P {x←t}) and (C R), we obtain (C P {x←t} | R = Q), by weakening and (Par). On the other hand, we obtain (E +C ) from (E +C ), by (Time), (Id) and (And).
Proof case, (Redn Begin):
and Q = P | R. Because D is subnormal, it ends in (Par) preceded by (Begin). Therefore (C, end(M) P ) and (C R). LetC = (C, end(M)) and E = (E, end(M)). By weakening and (Par), we obtain (C P | R = Q). From (E +C ), we obtain (E +C ), by weakening, (Id) and (And).
Let (E P) iff E is basic and there existsĀ such that (E +Ā ) and (Ā P) has a subnormal derivation. Let P σ → Q iff (t; n;Ā || P) σ → (t + 1; n; / 0 || Q) for some t, n,Ā. and (E P 2 ). Then, by induction hypothesis, (step + (E) Q 1 ) and (step + (E) Q 2 ). By definition of , this means that (step + (E) +B 1 ), (B 1 Q 1 ), (step + (E) +B 2 ) and (B 2 Q 2 ) for someB 1 ,B 2 . Then (step + (E) +B 1 ,B 2 ), by (And). By Lemma 4, (B 1 ,B 2 ). Therefore, we can use weakening and (Par) to obtain (B 1 ,B 2 Q). Then (step + (E) Q), by definition of .
Lemma 19 (Tick Preserves Typing
Proof case, (Tick Crack):
In this case, P = (st-secret(K) | crack {M} K is {x:T } y:U ; P ) and Q = P {x, y←M, K}. Because D is subnormal, it ends in (Par) preceded by (Crack).
Inverting these rules gives (Ā st-secret(K), {M} K :Un) and (step(Ā), x:Un, y:Un P ). LetĀ = (step(Ā), M:Un, K:Un). Applying substitutivity to (step(Ā), x:Un, y:Un P ) results in (Ā P {x, y←M, K} = Q). Cutting (E +Ā ) with (Ā st-secret(K), {M} K :Un) results in (E + st-secret(K), {M} K :Un). Then (step + (E) + public(K), {M} K :Un), by step invariance. Because step + (E) is basic, (step + (E) + public(K))'s derivation cannot end in (Id), thus ends in (Public), thus (step + (E) + K:Un). From (step + (E) + K:Un, {M} K :Un) we obtain (step + (E) + M:Un), by Lemma 15(b). Then (step + (E) + step(Ā), M:Un, K:Un =Ā ), by (And). From (step + (E) +Ā ) and (Ā Q) it follows that (step + (E) Q), by definition of .
Lemma 21 (Opponent Typability). If O is an opponent process and fv(O) = n, then ( n:Un O).
Proof By induction on the structure of P, using Lemma 20 and rules (Untag Un), (Decrypt Un), (Split Un) and (Match Un).
Lemma 22 (Safety).
If n are distinct, T are generative and ( n: T P), then P is safe.
Proof Suppose n are distinct, T are generative and ( n: T P). By Lemma 3, fv(P) ⊆ n. We may assume that new-bound names in P are distinct from n. For secrecy, suppose towards a contradiction that (t; fv(P); / 0 || P) ⇒ (s; m;Ā || R)
where R = (public(N) | τ-secret(M) | out N M | Q). Because fv(P) ⊆ n, it is then also the case that (t; n; / 0 || P) ⇒ (s; m;Ā || R). By (Good State), (t; n; / 0 || P) : . that (E + τ-secret(M)) and (E + M:Un). Because E is basic, the last rule of (E τ-secret(M))'s derivation can only be (Secret), thus (E + M : τ-Secret). Then, by (And), (E + M : τ-Secret, M : Un), in contradiction to Lemma 14. For authenticity, suppose (t; fv(P); / 0 || P) ⇒ (s; m;Ā || R) where R = (end(M) | Q).
Because fv(P) ⊆ n, it is then also the case that (t; n; / 0 || P) ⇒ (s; m;Ā || R). By (Good 
Theorem 2 (Robust Safety). If n are distinct, ( n: T public( n)) and ( n: T P), then P is robustly safe.
Proof Suppose n are distinct, ( n: T public( n)) and ( n: T P). From ( n: T public( n)) it follows that ( n: T n:Un). Then 
